With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: Capability Concentration and Decision-Making in Nuclear Alliance

Why, when, and how do nuclear-armed patrons involve their junior partners in making decisions about nuclear weapons? We argue that nuclear alliances’ decision-making styles are a function of the concentration of capabilities among the member states. We draw on the history of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War to shed light on how nuclear decision-making processes in these alliances evolved from unilateralism to multilateralism against the background of power shifts. We show that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact initially had high levels of power concentration, which meant the hegemon of each alliance could unilaterally impose decisions involving nuclear weapons on the junior partners. However, as capability concentration decreased over time, both alliances agreed to increasingly split the process and authority over nuclear weapons between the hegemon and individual allies. They transitioned to bilateralism and then to multilateralism and balanced two important goals: preserving the position of the hegemon as ‘primus inter pares’ while conceding a significant share of decision-making power to junior partners. Both alliances had to deal with the threat of atomisation, which eventually they managed to avoid. We also discuss the current challenges faced by NATO, in particular vis-à-vis Russia. We look at the request made by Poland to join NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and assess the likelihood of Washington agreeing to this request. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the responsibility that comes with decision-making authority over nuclear weapons and the need for junior partners to consider this responsibility as they gain more strength within the alliance.

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