

CHAPTER 17

**GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND
TÜRKİYE'S CONTRIBUTIONS**

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Abstract

Stating its purpose as “to maintain international peace and security”, the United Nations (UN) has been given the powers of taking collective measures against threats to or breaches of international peace and security by its Charter. One of these measures is the Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Although there are no provisions regarding the PKOs in the UN Charter, they have a long history, going back to the UN Military Observers in the Middle East in 1948. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, then in 1958, provided an adaptable framework for future PKOs. In line with this framework, the PKOs have been re-interpreted many times due to the changing international conjuncture and the changing nature of conflicts, and thus, the very nature of the PKOs has transformed in the last 75 years. Participating in the efforts of maintaining international peace and security under the flag of the UN for the first time in the Korean War of 1950, Türkiye has been consistently contributing to the PKOs. Türkiye considers PKOs as the legitimate means to realize one of its main foreign policy objectives, which is “to contribute to establish and maintain peace and stability in its region and beyond”, and thus provides both personnel and financial support. Since the PKOs have transformed, so have the contributions of Türkiye. This paper will consist of two parts. The first part will dwell on the transformation of the PKOs by dividing them into three generations. The structures and mandates of each generation are to be analyzed comparatively to establish the common characteristics of each generation. The second part will evaluate Türkiye's contributions to the ever-transforming PKOs. The changing contributions of Türkiye to the different generations of PKOs are to be evaluated to find a common pattern. Drawing on the conceptual framework of the English School (International Society Approach), this paper will track down the transformation of the PKOs and Türkiye's contribution to PKOs accordingly. Utilizing the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, UN reports, and UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) datasets as the primary resources, the paper uses the comparative analysis methodology to analyze the transformation of PKOs and Türkiye's contributions. The paper concludes that Türkiye's contributions are consistent with the general trajectory of the PKOs.

Keywords

*United Nations, Peacekeeping, Generations of Peacekeeping Operations,
Türkiye, Türkiye's Contributions to Peacekeeping*

Introduction

Established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind” (UN Charter, 1945), the United Nations (UN) states its first and foremost purpose as follows:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (UN Charter, 1945)

One of the collective measures that the UN may take is the Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Although the PKOs were not explicitly established or mentioned in the UN Charter, they have evolved into one of the main tools used by the UN to achieve its purpose. The UN PKOs have 75 years of history in which their nature and principles have transformed due to the changing international conjuncture and the changing nature of conflicts. Participating in the efforts of maintaining international peace and security under the flag of the UN for the first time in the Korean War of 1950, Türkiye has contributed to UN PKOs in line with its capabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2024a) and in line with the changing requirements of transformed PKOs.

The concept of peacekeeping is closely associated with the UN, but the organization does not monopolize PKOs. In fact, other international (and primarily regional) organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) engage in some form of PKOs of their own. However, this paper focuses on the PKOs authorized and conducted by the UN to limit the research with a single organization and respect space limitations.

The English School provides a conceptual framework for this paper, as its founding concept of International Society is essential for understanding the global changes in which the transformations of PKOs occurred and the reasons behind Türkiye's contributions to them. International Society, according to Bull (1977), is more than a structure comprised only of states and exists when a group of states having (and being aware of having) common interests and values form a society and they acknowledge that they are to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations and share in the workings of common institutions. Thus, the international society occurs with common interests and values (such as maintaining international peace and security) and common institutions (such as the UN), which provide certain rules and limitations. Bull (1977) also states that there are five fundamental institutions of the international society: the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers. Although the number and characteristics of these fundamental institutions may change over time, they are essential to provide order in the international society, which brings us to the matter at hand. The PKOs are fundamentally related to international law as the primary institution of the international society and to the UN (the UN Security Council, to be more precise) as the secondary institution. They have been and continue to be a tool for providing order, which means maintaining peace and security in the international society.

This paper will first present a short history of the PKOs and outline their transformation throughout their history in three generations. Then, it will evaluate Türkiye's contributions to the ever-changing PKOs to seek a pattern within each generation. In doing so, the paper will rely on the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, UN reports, UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) datasets, and statements from the governmental offices as the primary resources and employ the comparative analysis methodology to scrutinize the transformation of PKOs and Türkiye's contributions.


Three Generations of Peacekeeping Operations

As stated in the introduction, peacekeeping is one of many measures undertaken by the UN to maintain international peace and security. This practice is defined as an international conflict management tool in which military and/or civilian personnel are deployed in order to prevent hostilities between the parties and/or to create a suitable environment for negotiations during or after a conflict by the third-party states and under the auspices of a global or regional organization (James, 1990). However, this is an all-encompassing definition, and academia and practitioners need to understand how it relates to and differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. UNDPPO defines it as follows:

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars to incorporate a complex model of many elements –military, police, and civilian– working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace” (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations [UNDPPO], 2008).

As highlighted by the UNDPPO, Peacekeeping has continuously evolved throughout its history, integrating numerous activities aimed at fostering sustainable peace. Consequently, the delineation between various peace initiatives has become increasingly blurred, as seen in Figure 1 below. This means that PKOs are now rarely, if ever, confined to one type of peace activity.

Figure 1
Links and Grey Areas between Peace Activities (UNDPPO, 2008)



The reasons and effects of the current transition among the activities can be better understood when the generations of PKOs are explained in the subsections below. However, starting with the legal framework and short background is crucial, which will lead us to the three generations of PKOs.

As the UN Charter stipulates that its first purpose is to maintain international peace and security, it also gives the UNSC the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,¹ and the UNSC may and does adopt a range of measures through its resolutions. One of these measures

¹ Although the primary responsibility rests with the UNSC, “if the UNSC ... fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ... the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to make appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, ...” (A/RES/377(V)[AC]). This implementation became known as the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, which was used 13 times between 1951 and 2022. One of its very first implementations was General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 (A/RES/1001(ES-1)), authorizing the establishment of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) after the Suez Crisis.

includes the establishment and deployment of a UN PKO. The legal basis for the establishment and deployment of a PKO can be found in the Charter's Chapter VI "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", Chapter VII "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" or Chapter VIII "Regional Arrangements". Although the UN PKOs have traditionally been and still are associated with Chapter VI, the UNSC has never invoked Chapter VI (UNDPO, 2008). In the post-Cold War era, however, the UNSC has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII when authorizing the deployment of UN PKOs into volatile post-conflict environments. This change in pattern in resolutions can be seen both as a statement of political resolve of the international society and as a reminder to the parties to the conflict and all the states of their obligation towards the UNSC decisions as a part of the international society. As the English School points out, the states accept the common sets of rules and workings of common institutions, and they are expected to respect their obligations and rules of the international society.

When the UNSC decides to establish a PKO, a UNSC resolution on the subject is adopted, and this resolution includes the mandate of the PKO to be deployed, which is a set of duties, responsibilities, and authorities given to it. Since each conflict is ad hoc, each PKO and its mandate differ. However, a considerable degree of consistency is observed in the mandates given by the UNSC. The standard requirements from the PKOs may be classified as follows (UNDPO, 2024a):

- to deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
- to stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
- to assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and
- to lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development.

The mandates and, thus, the practice of UN PKOs have evolved and transformed throughout its history. However, three basic principles set by the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961) in a series of reports in the late 1950s have remained and still continue to guide the UN PKOs. These basic principles are

- Consent of the parties,
- Impartiality, and
- Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (UNDPO, 2024b).

These principles are closely interrelated and are considered indispensable for each PKO. Furthermore, in addition to these principles, the transformations of conflicts and, consequently, peace activities necessitate that UN PKOs be perceived as legitimate and credible. They must also strive to promote national and local ownership to achieve sustainable peace (UNDPO, 2008).

The very first UN PKO was established in 1948, only three years after the UN was founded. Since then, the UN has deployed 71 PKOs in which 783,677 personnel from 121 countries have participated, demonstrating the truly global nature of peacekeeping efforts (55,762 troops, 1,770 Staff Officers, 6,917 Police and 1,042 Experts on Mission) (UNDPO, 2024c).

The categorization of UN PKOs is needed for many reasons: The 75-year history is a long one, and there have been many transformations in global politics and international society in the last three-quarters of the century, and these transformations changed the nature and characteristics of the PKOs just as they changed the nature of conflicts. The number of operations conducted is high but dispersed unevenly throughout the history of PKOs. Some scholars have categorized the PKOs into two as "traditional" PKOs and "multi-dimensional" PKOs with the end of the Cold War, marking the point of separation. The terms "traditional" and "multi-dimensional" PKOs are also used in the UN Document titled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" (UNDPO, 2008). However, this categorization seems too general and even outdated because the PKOs deployed after the Cold War significantly differ from each other in the first decade after the Cold War and at the beginning of the 21st century. The transformations and shifts after the Cold War also caused an increase in the academic focus on the PKOs.

Academics began to identify chronological trends in their attempt to create analytical tools to understand the changing context of the PKOs (Hellmüller et al., 2022) and thus to understand their transformations. These analyses opened a path to the generation-based typology. This typology used by many scholars can be considered more valuable because it implies that the evolution of peacekeeping took place sequentially and progressively (Hatto, 2013; Bellamy & Williams, 2010). As Hatto (2013) points out, the term “generations” started to be used around 1992 (See Abi-Saab, 1992; Ghébali, 1992; Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992; Findlay, 1996; Malan, 1998).

According to this generation-based typology, the PKOs are commonly categorized into three generations as follows:

- First Generation UN PKOs (Cold War Period, 1945-1989)
- Second Generation UN PKOs (First Decade of Post-Cold War Era, 1990-2000s)
- Third Generation UN PKOs(21st Century, 2000s-...)

In the following subsections, the PKOs in each generation are analyzed according to their structure and mandates to establish their characteristics, and the transformation of the PKOs will be outlined in line with the changes that occurred between the generations.

First Generation PKOs

The first generation PKOs were the ones authorized and conducted during the Cold War. These PKOs were essentially missions presented as being primarily observational, tasked with aiding belligerents in ending hostilities and preventing combat resurgence. However, these missions were often constrained by political stalemates resulting from Cold War rivalries (Bellamy & Williams, 2010; Hellmüller et al., 2022).

The first UN peacekeeping missions were the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in the sub-continent India, both of which were established in 1948 and deployed their personnel in 1949 (S/RES/50(1948) and S/RES/47(1948) respectively). Both conflicts shared several characteristics in common, so both PKOs have similar mandates or a small number of unarmed military observers to monitor the ceasefire and report any violations and to create a buffer zone. The personnel were instructed not to get involved in the affairs and not to attempt to resolve conflicts. As Peter (2019) puts it, they were sent to manage these conflicts, not to resolve them. The global politics and rivalries of the Cold War era obstructed the ways the PKOs were formed from time to time and, even if formed, to achieve success in their mandates.

The first PKO to include armed military personnel was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was sent to Egypt in 1956 (A/RES/1001(ES-I)). However, as was the case in the first two PKOs, UNEF I personnel were also forbidden to interfere in internal matters or undertake any activities that could influence the balance of power between conflicting parties. The UNEF II and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (S/RES/186(1964)) were other PKOs with similar limited mandates.

Since the PKOs were newly introduced peace activities and no written legal framework was present at the time, the basic principles developed by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (that is, consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except for self-defense) became the “holy trinity” for all first generation PKOs. The UN peacekeeping activities were essentially limited to monitoring ceasefires in inter-state disputes for the first forty years due to the rivalries of great powers of the Cold War period.

Second Generation PKOs

The PKOs began to transform in many ways after the end of the Cold War, which led the way for the Second Generation PKOs. First, the number of PKOs rapidly increased in the first years of the post-Cold War era. One of the reasons for this is that the end of bi-polar world rivalries and the reduction of geopolitical competition between the superpowers unlocked certain impasses for the UNSC. Another reason, in relation to the first one, is that a newly reached consensus on fundamental human rights and a shared sense of purpose gave power to the international society to act on the conflicts threatening international peace and security. Thus, the number of PKOs rapidly increased, with a total of 20 new operations authorized by the UNSC between 1989 and 1994 (UNDOP, 2024f).

Second, as the nature of conflicts changed and the geography of the conflicts spread throughout the world, including Europe, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PKOs also began to change qualitatively in order to respond to the new types of conflicts and new challenges in the missions (UNDPO, 2008). The conflicts became more intra-state, and the parties involved began to vary. Thus, the “traditional” missions involving observation or creation of buffer zones gave way to more complex “multi-dimensional” PKOs with their ever-expanding mandates. This transformation and expanded mandates also required a change in the structure of the missions, involving police force and civilian experts in addition to the military personnel. However, the main body of the personnel was still mostly military due to the active conflicts involved. Also, while continuing to remain the fundamental rules, the “holy trinity” principles (consent, impartiality, non-use of force except for self-defense) had to be disregarded most of the time to provide answers to a more complex PKO environment.

The transformation of the second generation PKOs was a gradual process. While the first PKOs after the end of the Cold War were faithful to the traditional peacekeeping model, the UN PKO missions’ focus gradually extended (Hellmüller et al., 2022). The new mandates began to cover more complex tasks, from monitoring and observation to helping free and fair elections, facilitating the implementation of peace agreements, advising government authorities, and assisting humanitarian relief operations.

It is also important to remember that some of the first generation PKOs (such as UNTSO, UNMOGIP, and UNFICYP) were also active with their original mandates during this time. The mandates of the early second generation PKOs such as UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) (S/RES/619(1988)), UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) (S/RES/696(1991)), UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) (S/RES/689(1991)), and UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) (S/RES/644(1989)) had similar tasks with the first generation PKOs, such as monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces, supervising ceasefires, and overseeing peace agreements. The first UN PKO tasked with more than monitoring was the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989-1990 (S/RES/632(1989)) with the primary mandate to observe free and fair elections. This mission marked the first transformation of the peacekeeping operations and opened the path for ever-transforming and ever-expanding mandates for the new PKOs. The examples were UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (S/RES/693(1991)), UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (S/RES/797(1992)), and UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) (S/RES/1035(1995)).

The early second generation PKOs were judged largely successful (Howard, 2007). However, with the expansion of the second generation missions both qualitatively and quantitatively, the evaluation and criticism inevitably began within the international society. The more extensive and more complex operations like UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia (S/RES/743(1992)), UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (S/RES/872(1993)) and UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (S/RES/814(1993)) failed to achieve their tasks. They were highly criticized since they were ineffective in preventing conflicts and exercising their mandates. The criticism of their effectiveness and the unintended consequences of the mission brought forth the idea of reform, and the UN aimed to establish a more robust infrastructure for peacekeeping (Kiraz, 2020).

The reform efforts of the UN PKOs included the 1992 Agenda for Peace (ST/DPI/1247, 1992), the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60 and S/1995/1, 1995), the establishment of Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) in 1992 and reports of independent inquiries regarding the failures in Rwanda (S/1999/1257, 1999), Former Yugoslavia (A/54/549, 1999), and Somalia (S/1995/231, 1995). The first Humanitarian Development Report (UN Development Programme [UNDP], (1994)) was also an essential document for the PKOs in the sense that it introduced a new concept of human security, equating security with people rather than states/territories of states. This concept of prioritizing human (security) over the state (security) was also influential in transforming the PKOs, which would be more human rights-oriented in the future rather than state-oriented. The report of the Panel on UNPKOs (known as Brahimi Report) dated March 2000 was instrumental in assessing the shortcomings of the existing system and making realistic recommendations for the future of the PKOs (A/55/305 and S/2000/809, 2000). These reform efforts once again transformed the PKOs into the next generation.

Third Generation PKOs

At the turn of the 21st century, the PKOs started to become more complex than ever due to various factors, such as the continuous change in the nature of the conflicts, the start of the global war on terror, the increase in the number and characteristics of the warring parties (non-state, sub-state, and trans-national actors as well as the state actors). In addition to this transformation in the global arena, reform efforts of the UN trying to keep up with the current threats to international peace and security opened the path for the third generation PKOs.

This latest generation of PKOs emerged with a shift towards a robust mission with enforcement mandates and linked to the introduction of two principles: the protection of civilians and stabilization (Hellmüller et al., 2022). The principle of protection of civilians was not a brand-new principle but was closely linked to the “holy trinity” of peacekeeping. On the other hand, the principle of stabilization was relatively new, but it became a core feature in the PKOs because the international society and, thus, the UN realized the seriousness of spill-over effects of conflicts and instabilities.

The first PKO with an expressly stated mandate for the protection of civilians was the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (S/RES/1270(1999)). After UNAMSIL, the principle of protecting civilians became a task mentioned in every PKO’s mandate. The first PKO including the term stabilization was the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (S/RES/1542(2004)). As was the case with MINUSTAH, many missions were deployed in active conflict zones and authorized to enforce the end of violence. The examples were the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S/RES/1925(2010)), the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (S/RES/2100(2013)), and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (S/RES/2149(2014)).

The transformation and expansion of the mandates of the PKO continued to involve a wider variety of tasks. Mandates of missions from Bosnia Herzegovina (UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) [S/RES/1035(1995)]) to Haiti (UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) [S/RES/1063(1996)]) and UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) [S/RES/1123(1997)]) and Sierra Leone (UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) [S/RES/1270(1999)]) asked the peacekeepers to help with reforms of the rule of law and security sector reforms in addition to their traditional tasks. UN peacekeepers focusing more on the economic aspects were asked to build basic institutional structures and assist states in establishing post-conflict functionality and legitimacy. In the most extreme cases like Kosovo (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) [S/RES/1244(1999)]) and Timor-Leste (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) [S/RES/1272(1999)]), UN peacekeepers were even given temporary executive law enforcement and administrative authority over a territory (Peter, 2019). This transformation shows that the UN has become more ambitious in resolving conflicts and maintaining peace and security than its previous undertakings of conflict management in the first-generation missions. In short, the UN Peacekeepers were increasingly asked to undertake various complex tasks, from helping build sustainable governance institutions to human rights monitoring and security sector reform to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.

The increase in the variety of tasks also has required a change in the personnel structure of the missions. Although the military remained the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, there were now many different professionals participating in peacekeeping missions, including administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, and communications/public information experts (UNDPO, 2024f). The transformation in the personnel structure led to the establishment of the United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in 2007 (UNDPO, 2024g).

The reform efforts within the UN continued for this generation of PKOs. Just before the OROLSI, a Peacebuilding Commission was established by the UN to bring together all relevant actors and provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors in

2005 (A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645(2005)). The Peace Operations 2010 (A/60/696, 2006) document containing reform strategy for the DPO and The Capstone Doctrine (ST/DPKO(09)/P3551, 2008) outlining the principles and guidelines for peacekeepers were essential documents for the transformation of PKOs. The then Secretary-General established a High-Level Independent Panel on UN PKOs to prepare a comprehensive assessment of the UN PKOs (UN, 2014). The panel delivered its detailed report six months later (A/70/95 and S/2015/446, 2015). Lastly, to respond to the ever-transforming challenges, the Secretary-General launched Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) in 2018 to refocus peacekeeping with more targeted mandates, make operations stronger and safer, mobilize support for political solutions and better equipped and trained forces (UN, 2018; UN, 2024).

To conclude this section, the general characteristics of each generation of PKOs can be summarized as follows:

Table 1
Characteristics of Generations of PKOs (Authors' compilation)

Generation	Period	Characteristics
First Generation	Cold War Period (1945-1989)	<p>Limited in Quantity and in Quality. Similar Mandates: to observe/monitor ceasefires, report violations, and create a buffer zone in inter-state conflicts. Simple Aim: to manage conflicts rather than to resolve them, peacekeeping. Fundamental Principles: Consent, Impartiality, and Non-use of force except for self-defense. Related to UN Charter: Chapter VI. Personnel: Almost all military (troops).</p>
Second Generation	First Decade of Post-Cold War Era (end of 1980s-1990s)	<p>Rapid increase in Quantity and in Quality. Gradually Varying Mandates: to cover more tasks from monitoring and observation to helping free and fair elections, facilitating the implementation of peace agreements, advising government authorities, and assisting humanitarian relief operations, mostly in intra-state conflicts. Evolving Aim: to resolve conflicts, to assist those in need, and peace enforcement. Fundamental Principles: Consent, Impartiality, and Non-use of force except for self-defense disregarded. Related to UN Charter: Chapter VII. Personnel: mostly military (troops), but police officers and civilian experts also included.</p>
Third Generation	The 21st Century (2000s-...)	<p>Slow increase in Quantity but rapid increase in Quality and shift towards more robust missions. Varying Mandates: (in addition to previous mandates) to undertake various complex tasks, from helping build sustainable governance institutions to human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. Ever-Evolving Aim: to resolve conflicts, maintain peace and security, and peacebuilding. Fundamental Principles: (in addition to fundamental principles) introduction of two more principles as the Protection of Civilians and Stabilization. Related to UN Charter: Chapter VII. Personnel: military still an important component of the structure, but many different professionals, in addition to police officers and civilian experts introduced.</p>

The transformation of the PKOs in different generations is closely linked to the changes in the international society. After the end of the Cold War, the members of international society joined together in common values and common interests (fundamental human rights and maintenance of international peace and security) more than ever. This newly found consensus in the international society, in turn, gave more power to institutions like international law (and in line with it, the UN as a secondary institution), enabling the evolution in the aims of the PKOs, the increase in their numbers, the expansion of their mandates.

Türkiye's Contributions to Ever-Transforming Peacekeeping Operations

As stated in the introduction, Türkiye has contributed to the UN PKOs in line with its capabilities (MFA, 2024a) and in consistency with the changing requirements of the transformed PKOs.

The idea of maintaining international peace and security and contributing to it as a member of an international society is deeply rooted in the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye. The founder of the Republic of Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, expressed his thoughts on the subject in a meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister who visited Ankara in 1937 follows:

One should think about the peace and prosperity of all the nations of the world as much as he thinks about the existence and happiness of the nation to which he belongs, and as much as he values the happiness of his own nation, he should endeavor as much as he can to serve the happiness of all the nations of the world because working for the welfare of the nations of the world also means working for one's own peace and welfare. If there is no peace, clarity, and good co-existence in the world and among the world's nations, a nation is deprived of peace no matter what it does for itself. We cannot know that an event that we think is far away will not affect us one day. For this reason, it is necessary to consider all of humanity as one body and each nation as a limb of it. The pain at the tip of one body's finger affects all the other parts. If there is a disturbance in any part of the world, we should not say, 'What do I care?'; if there is such a disturbance, we should deal with it as if it were happening among ourselves. (Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), 2024a)

The quotation from Atatürk clearly shows that the idea of international society and its contribution to it are cornerstones of the Republic of Türkiye's foreign policy.

In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) states that one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy is to contribute to establishing and maintaining peace and stability in its region and beyond, portraying peacekeeping operations as the legitimate means to realize this objective (MFA, 2024a). MFA recently presented its "Enterprising and Humanitarian" Foreign Policy, pointing out that an "action-oriented, innovative, and principled foreign policy is a must in a trouble-ridden region and world" (Çavuşoğlu, 2018). MFA builds this novel policy as a contribution to Atatürk's founding foreign policy vision, "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad" (Çavuşoğlu, 2021). This contribution also points out the continuation of the idea of international society and maintaining international peace in Türkiye's foreign relations. Being a member of the international society, Türkiye also gives utmost importance to the UN as the only global institution that establishes norms and rules for protecting international peace and security and contributes to UN activities in every field (MFA, 2024b). Türkiye aspires to become one of the leading powers in the international society and contributes to the UN PKOs, which aim to maintain international peace and security, although the level and character of its contributions have changed throughout the history of PKOs. However, as seen below, these changes in Türkiye's contributions are consistent with the transformation of the PKOs.

However, Türkiye's contributions occur not only at the discourse level but also at the operational level in many ways. One of these operational (or factual) ways is the troops and personnel contributions to the peace operations. Before moving onto these contributions, it is also imperative to point out shorty other factual or material ways of Türkiye's contributions to peace and security as a part of its evolving foreign policy mission in order to show that Türkiye performs more at the operational level, not just using the discourse level. First, Türkiye has the experience to assume the role of a mediator or a facilitator between the conflicting parties for a long time. To give a few examples, Türkiye facilitated

the dialogue between Sudan and South Sudan on economic cooperation, mediated between Somalia and Somaliland (as of 2013), and brokered indirect talks between Syria and Israel (2008). Türkiye also facilitated the internal reconciliation in Iraq (2005, 2010, and 2018), Lebanon (2008), Kyrgyzstan (2010), and Palestine (as of 2011) and formulated the policies towards the establishment of trilateral processes with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (2009), Croatia (2010), and Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007) (Akçapar, 2021). Second, Türkiye regularly contributes to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, established in 2006. Pledging 800,000 USD in 2024, the Government of Türkiye has contributed 3,560,000 USD cumulatively to the Peacebuilding Fund as of 31 December 2023 (UN Peacebuilding, 2024; UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office [UNMPTF Office], 2024).

Third, Türkiye actively participates in the Challenges Forum platform, which was launched in 1996 to discuss the challenges of peace operations in a systematic, result-oriented way and which organizes several different types of forums and seminars each year. Türkiye also hosted a Challenges seminar on “Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and the Continuing Need for Reform” in 2003 and successfully enabled the inclusion of the Challenges research findings in the UN reports (Güngör, 2015). Fourth, Türkiye also has a lively academic interest in peacekeeping. There are research centers in the universities, such as the Peace Education, Application and Research Center at Boğaziçi University, the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research at Bilkent University, the Conflict Analysis and Peace Research Center at İbn Haldun University, and the Comparative Civilization and Peace Studies Center in Ankara University. There is also a journal titled “Journal of Peace Research and Conflict Resolution”, creating a platform for academic articles on peace studies and conflict resolution, including peacekeeping operations (DergiPark, 2024). As a result of this ongoing academic interest, there are 106 dissertations (27 doctoral and 79 masters) dissertations about peacekeeping recorded in the Thesis Center of the Council of Higher Education as of July 2024 (Ulusal Tez Merkezi, 2024). Of these dissertations, 84 are in the field of International Relations, 12 are in the field of Law, and the rest are in Defense Technologies and Political Sciences.

Fifth, in addition to the material contributions, Türkiye contributed as the leader or force commander in the peacekeeping operations. Without diverting much from the scope of the paper, we can list these operations as follows: Türkiye assumed the command of a peacekeeping operation for the first time in UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from April 1993 to January 1994. Thus, Somalia constituted an excellent arena for Türkiye to show its capabilities (Güngör, 2017). Türkiye also successfully commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) between June 2002 and February 2003 and then from February to August 2005, as well as taking responsibility for Kabul Regional Command from November 2009 to December 2014 (Karadağ, 2019). In addition to its ability to lead, Türkiye also contributes troops and personnel to peace operations, which will be examined per three generations of UN PKOs in the following pages.

Three documents determine Türkiye's policy and legal procedures for its contributions to PKOs. The first document is the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye and Article 92, titled “Declaration of state of war and authorization to deploy the armed forces”. This article stipulates that “The power ... where required by international treaties to which Türkiye is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and ... is vested in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.” (Grand National Assembly of Türkiye [GNAT], 2019).

The second document is the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. Its Article 130, titled “Sending or admission of armed forces” lays out the procedure, stating that “... upon the request of the President of the Republic, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye authorizes the sending of the Turkish Armed Forces abroad ... for a specified period of time. The President of the Republic executes this decision.” (GNAT, 2019). So, the PKO missions, the number of troops to be sent, and other conditions to direct Türkiye's contributions are specified in the GNAT decision upon the request of the President of Türkiye. While the military personnel (troops and staff officers) are determined by the GNAT decision, the police officers or other civilians (experts or observers) are contracted to the PKO missions under Article 77 of Law No. 657, which regulates the “Service in a foreign country or international organization” (Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, 2024) and gives the authority to the Minister of the relevant Ministry (in case of police officers, the Minister of Interior).

The last one (in fact, two inter-connected documents) is from the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces: Concept on Türkiye's Contribution to Peace Support Operations (TAF, 2010a) and Doctrine on Türkiye's Contributions to Peace Support Operations (TAF, 2010b). The Concept projects a systemic integration for TAF's PKOs in the mid-to-long term and provides a way for future documents regarding PKOs. The Doctrine sets out the principles of planning and execution of joint PKOs at the strategic and operative levels, puts forth the principles for the use of TAF in PKOs, directs other documents regarding PKOs, and explains the basic principles regarding PKOs.

As for the history of Türkiye in the PKOs, Türkiye became a contributor to the efforts of maintaining international peace by sending 15,000 troops in total to the Korean War (1950-1953). Türkiye responded to the call of the international society by adhering to the UNSC Resolution to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area (S/RES/83(1950)). As the first example of Türkiye's sending troops to a conflict zone abroad, the Korean War is considered a milestone in terms of participation in peace missions (MFA, 2024a; TAF, 2024a). Türkiye contributed troops to the coalition forces not only to restore international peace and security but also to prove that it was a member of international society. Türkiye aimed to present itself as a respectable and rule-abiding member of the international society with its sizable contribution to the coalition forces in Korea. It then became a member of NATO, achieving the status it aspired to have.

However, the contributions of Türkiye to PKOs seemed to decrease sharply during the rest of the Cold War period, and Türkiye did not participate in any UN PKOs until the end of the Cold War. There are several reasons for Türkiye to refrain from getting involved in the first generation of UN PKOs. First, Türkiye's fundamental interest and strategy during the Cold War was to strengthen its position within the Western security system and reinforce its security against the threat of the Soviet Union. Thus, Türkiye only participated in the Korean War and then adopted the policy of "non-involvement" throughout the rest of the Cold War (Kiraz, 2020). Secondly, Türkiye's foreign policy during this time was cautious and conservative (which was a clear product of the concern regarding the threat of the Soviets), and consequently, Türkiye focused on national defense and economic development while seeking security primarily through a strategic alliance with the United States and NATO membership (Satana, 2013). Third, it may also be argued that Türkiye did not participate in UN peacekeeping missions during this period since these missions were deemed "missions empowered to 'manage' conflicts rather than 'resolve' them" (Oğuzlu & Güngör, 2006). Considering the global rivalries and the inactivity of the UN due to bi-polar politics, the position of Türkiye seems to fall in line with the general trajectory of the PKOs, having a small number of missions and limited mandates in its first generation.

As the PKOs began to transform rapidly with the end of the Cold War (entering the second generation phase), so did Türkiye's policies regarding the contribution to the UN missions. Türkiye began to adopt a relatively more active foreign policy, stressing the importance of regional cooperation and multilateralism in the international society. Coupled with this newly formed active policy, the turmoil and the conflicts in the neighboring regions led Türkiye to pursue more active participation in the PKOs to contribute to maintaining international peace and security. Becoming one of the main contributors to peace activities in the 1990s, Türkiye participated in nearly all observance missions while adhering to specific rules when participating in peacekeeping missions. For example, Türkiye preferred to send mainly military observers, who were usually away from direct conflicts and only in the position of monitoring and reporting. The troops were sent to UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II under certain conditions since these missions were important in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. Türkiye also gave priority to sending personnel to PKOs, which were deployed in its neighborhood, as seen below:

Table 2*Türkiye's Contributions in the 1990s (compiled from TAF, 2024b and UNDPO, 2024e)*

Mission Name	Active Period of the Mission	Türkiye's Personnel Contribution
<i>UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)</i>	<i>Aug 1988 - Feb 1991</i>	<i>2 Military Observers in 1991</i>
<i>UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)</i>	<i>Apr 1991 - Oct 2003</i>	<i>6 Military Observers from 1992 to 2002</i>
<i>UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)</i>	<i>Feb 1992 - Mar 1995</i>	<i>1464 Troops in 1994 and 1166 Troops in 1995</i>
<i>UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</i>	<i>Aug 1993 - Jun 2009</i>	<i>5 Military Observers from 1994 to 2008</i>
<i>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)</i>	<i>Mar 1993 - Mar 1995</i>	<i>320 Troops in 1993</i>

Table 2 shows that Türkiye's contributions were focused on the Balkans and the Middle East while also reaching out to the Caucasus and Africa. It is noteworthy to point out that a Turkish Lieutenant General assumed the role of Force Commander of UNOSOM between 4 May 1993 and 18 January 1994 (TAF, 2024b) since it was an important development for Türkiye to increase its prestige in the international society and highlight its efforts to become an actor in maintaining international peace and security.

There are many reasons for Türkiye to increase its participation in the second generation of PKOs, both qualitatively and quantitatively, right after the end of the Cold War. First, faced with new regional and international threats to international security, Türkiye prioritized being a part of international activities to resolve crises and conflicts as one of its foreign policy goals (Bekar, 2019). Second, Türkiye contributed to the PKOs in its immediate neighborhood, such as the Balkans and the Middle East, to compensate for the geopolitical importance thought to have been lost in the new era (Kiraz, 2020). It must also be mentioned that the Balkans and the Caucasus were (and still are) important to Türkiye due to ethnic and historical ties with the populations there and that the Middle East has significance due to the long and porous border shared with the regional states. On the other hand, the contributions to the African mission might be attributed to Türkiye's aspirations to be present in Africa, providing security for the continent and the international society. Third, Türkiye's rising contributions could be explained by normative explanations in the 1990s, resulting in its political aspirations to become a regional and global player and improve the country's standing in international society (Satana, 2013). Considering the fact that the PKOs of the period in question concentrated in the Balkans, Middle East, and Africa (22 PKOs out of 36 PKOs), which are also in Türkiye's immediate neighborhood, the increase in Türkiye's contributions is consistent with the increase in the number of PKOs.

Another significant Turkish contribution to be mentioned here is the establishment of the Partnership for Peace Training Centre in 1998. Although it was established with the NATO and multinational operations first in mind and recognized as the first recognized partnership training center by NATO on 12 February 1999 (Partnership for Peace Training Centre [PTC-TUR], 2024a), the centre conducts courses, mobile training activities, and seminars for peacekeepers from all over the world (a total of 22.384 military and civilian participants from 108 different countries). The center is still active and has put out a calendar involving 16 courses for 2024 (PTC-TUR, 2024b).

As the PKOs continued to transform with the start of the 21st century (entering the third generation), as stated in the previous section, the contributions of Türkiye once again increased, and this time, diversified in line with the complex nature of peacekeeping activities.

The Turkish foreign policy goals were revised to be more active and present in international society, and the policy of involvement in UN peace activities was prioritized at the turn of the century. Turkish prioritization and active involvement in the PKOs, in turn, helped Türkiye's aspirations to become a prestigious and vital actor in the international society, including its election to a non-permanent seat on the UNSC for 2009-2010. However, there seems to be a decline in Turkish contributions in the second half of the 2010s.

Table 3

Türkiye's Contributions in the 2000s (compiled from TAF, 2024b and UNDPO, 2024e)

Mission Name	Active Period of the Mission	Türkiye's Personnel Contribution
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	March 1978 - ...	84 to 746 Troops from 2006 to 2023 (highest in 2007) 2 Staff Officers from 2017 to 2023
UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH)	Dec 1995 - Dec 2002	13 to 38 Polices from 1996 to 2002 (highest in 2001) 1 Observer in 2001
UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Nov 1999 - Jun 2010	3 to 20 Polices from 2002 to 2009 (highest in 2005)
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	June 1999 - ...	49 to 214 Polices from 1999 to 2008 (highest in 2003) 1 Police and/or 1 Expert from 2009 to 2023
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and then UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	Oct 1999 - May 2002 May 2002 - May 2005	2 Observers from 2000 to 2003 1 to 20 Polices from 2000 to 2004 (highest in 2001)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	Mar 2002 - ...	1 Police in 2010 and 1 Expert from 2012 to 2014
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Mar 2005 - Jul 2011	9 to 38 Polices and 3 Troops from 2005 to 2009 (highest in 2008)
UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	Jul 2007 - Dec 2020	1 to 76 Polices from 2007 to 2021 (highest in 2013)
UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	July 2010 - ...	5 to 14 Polices from 2010 to 2023 (highest in 2012)
UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	July 2011 - ...	11 to 35 Polices from 2011 to 2023 (highest in 2022)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	June 2013 - ...	1 Expert from 2016 to 2023


Table 3 shows that the contributions of Türkiye have become more geographically diversified at the beginning of the 2000s to include Africa and Asia, as well as the Balkans and the Middle East. Türkiye also changed its policy to adhere only to the observation missions and began participating in assistance and interim administration missions, which had more complex mandates and a more civilian nature than before. This change led Türkiye to send civilian peacekeepers (experts and police) as well as military (staff officers and troops). Turkish contributions began to decrease after 2014, but it must be noted that this decline in Türkiye's contributions is consistent with the general trajectory of the active PKOs. As some PKO missions were terminated in 2014/2015, the number and size of PKO missions started to decrease.

There are many reasons for Türkiye to have different positions in contributing to the third generation PKOs at the beginning of the 2000s and in the second half of the 2010s. There are four reasons for the increase at the beginning of the 2000s. First, Türkiye's contribution to the PKOs deployed in certain regions and countries helped the international efforts and improved the missions' success due to Türkiye's ethnic and cultural ties with the said regions (Bekar, 2019). So, Türkiye became a preferred contributor for certain PKOs, thus increasing its presence/prestige and becoming a trusted actor in the international society. Second, Turkish foreign policy goals and implementation substantially changed during this period, expanding the reach of Turkish military and diplomacy worldwide, including Africa, Asia, and South America. Aiming to become both a regional and a global actor in international society, Türkiye followed an active foreign policy, which had the pillars of increased economic cooperation, effectiveness in international organizations, and proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy (Kiraz, 2020). However, some scholars presented a different argument for this change in Turkish foreign policy. Oğuzlu (2015), for example, explained this change as the emergence of the idea that contributing to peace and stability in its neighborhood and on a global scale is important for Türkiye to achieve stability within itself. Third, Türkiye assumed a more normative argument in explaining and defending its participation in the PKOs in different continents, in addition to its immediate neighborhood. These normative, value-based, and ideational explanations can be found in the statements of the TAF and MFA regarding the Turkish contributions to the PKOs (TAF, 2024a; TAF, 2024b; MFA, 2024a). These normative and value-based arguments also point out the common values and common interests, which, according to the English School, are fundamental for the states to form or become a part of international society and which may also form the common rules in time. These official statements align with the founding foreign policy vision and underscore the commitment to international society. They also reflect the aspiration to play a significant role on the global stage. Fourth, as some scholars argued, Türkiye increased its contributions both qualitatively and quantitatively in the 2000s, to be precise between 2003 and 2008, due to its campaign to be elected as the non-permanent member of the UNSC for the 2009-2010 period (Küçük, 2023; Güngör, 2008). This active increase in its contributions helped Türkiye to win a non-permanent seat in the UNSC and improved its position in the international society.

However, as stated above, Turkish contributions to third generation PKOs decreased in the second half of the 2010s, which is consistent with the decrease in the number of active PKOs. In addition to this, the new threats to its security, either along or within its borders, forced Türkiye to redefine its concept of security and foreign policy during this period (Bekar, 2019). Due to these close threats, Türkiye had to adopt a more national security-based approach due to these new security threats (Kiraz, 2020). However, this approach did not affect the number of personnel already sent to the existing missions.


Before evaluating Türkiye's contributions to ever-transforming PKOs and finalizing our paper, it may be helpful to overview the current situation of the UN PKOs and Türkiye's current contributions to them. As of the end of 2023, the UN has 12 PKOs, as seen in Map 1. There are 121 countries contributing 63.119 uniformed personnel (53.984 troops, 1030 military observers, 1.628 staff officers, and 6.477 police). With 3820 international civilian personnel, 8176 local civilian personnel, and 1188 UN Volunteers, the total number of personnel serving in 12 PKOs is 76.303(UNDPO, 2024j).

Map 1
Current UN PKOs as of 31 December 2023 (UNDPO, 2024j)



Türkiye contributed to seven PKOs as of the end of 2023, as seen in Graph 1, with 112 military personnel (one of which is a staff officer), 40 police officers, and two civilian experts.

Graph 1
Türkiye's Contributions by Mission and Personnel Type (as of 30 November 2023) (UNDPO, 2024h)



As seen in Graph 1, as of November 2023, Türkiye participates in the PKOs selectively both in terms of missions and in terms of personnel. Regarding missions, Türkiye focuses mainly on Africa (Lebanon, Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo, Mali, and Somalia), except for the Kosovo mission in the Balkans. Regarding personnel, Türkiye prefers to send separate personnel types for each mission, putting clear distinctions among the missions. Deploying its military personnel only to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (S/RES/425(1978) and S/RES/426(1978)), Türkiye prefers to send its police officers but only in small numbers to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (S/RES/1996(2011)); the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (S/RES/2149(2014)), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S/RES/1925(2010)), and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (S/RES/2100(2013)). Türkiye's contribution of civilian experts is limited to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/RES/1244(1999)) and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) (S/RES/2102(2013)).

Conclusion

As an active participant in the UN and in the international society, Türkiye contributes to the UN's efforts to maintain international peace and security. Both the MFA and the TAF statements support these efforts, considering peacekeeping operations as legitimate means to achieve international peace and security. Türkiye's participation in these efforts, in turn, helps to enhance Türkiye's presence and role in international society.


In fact, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix thanked Türkiye for its strong support of United Nations Peacekeeping and the service and sacrifice of its uniformed personnel deployed around the world under the UN flag on 9 November 2022, stating that:

Türkiye is a longstanding contributor of peacekeepers to the United Nations. It currently provides 179 military and police personnel, including 24 women, to eight UN peace operations, making it the 60th largest contributor. ... Turkish military and police make a tangible difference wherever they serve. On the ground, they demonstrate a high-level of professionalism and dedication, and we are deeply grateful for their continued contribution. We will never forget the sacrifice of the six Turkish peacekeepers who lost their lives over the years while serving under the UN flag. (UNDPO, 2024i)

However, it is important to stress that Türkiye's contributions of military personnel, police officers, and civilian experts changed in line with the transformations of the PKOs throughout the UN's 75-year history of peace activities, albeit with slight differences starting from the second half of the 2010s. This change is visible in the following graphics.

Graph 2


Comparison of Numbers of UN PKOs and Mission to Which Türkiye Contributed (compiled from International Peace Institute [IPI], 2024) and UNDPO, 2024h)



Türkiye's contributions began to follow the increase in PKOs as of the 1990s, with brief interruptions of just a few years at the turn of the century and around 2015/2016. Graph 2 also shows that Türkiye has contributed and still contributes to half of the PKO missions yearly. The number of missions to which Türkiye contributed increased between 2004 and 2009, and this presence in the PKOs improved Türkiye's stance in the UN and in the international society, as stated above. Although Türkiye's contributions seem to decline after 2015 (from 10 missions in 2015 to 7 missions in 2023), this decline goes hand in hand with the decrease in total missions, which went from 17 to 12. So, it is safe to point out that the number of missions Türkiye contributed to follows the general trajectory of the total numbers of PKOs, with only minor deviations.

Graph 3

Türkiye's Personnel Contributions to PKOs per Year (compiled from IPI, 2024 and UNDPO, 2024h)



Türkiye's personnel contributions have seen more variation since the 1990s. There was a spike in 1994 and 1995 in troop contributions due to the highest number of military personnel sent to the UNPROFOR mission, which stands out in Türkiye's peacekeeping history. The total number of personnel increased in the first ten years of the 2000s for the reasons stated above, and this increase is in line with the increase in the number of missions to which Türkiye contributed. However, as the number of contributed missions declined after 2015, as seen in Graph 3, the number of personnel sent to these missions remained relatively the same.

Graph 3 also shows the significant change in the structure of the personnel. The personnel mainly consisted of troops and military observers in the 1990s. However, the number of troops fluctuated in the 2000s and decreased in the 2010s, and the number of police increased at the turn of the century. The number of military observers or experts spiked also in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This change in the numbers shows a diversification of personnel type sent to missions by Türkiye and is in line with the change in the structure of personnel of PKOs as stated above.

This paper concludes that Türkiye's contributions follow the suit of transformation of PKOs in general. In the first generation, PKOs mainly aimed to monitor the ceasefires, but their number was limited due to the political stalemates of the Cold War period. Considering the global rivalries and the inactivity of the UNSC, the position of Türkiye refraining from getting involved in the PKOs seems consistent with the general trajectory of the PKOs. With the end of the Cold War, the PKOs began to transform gradually and thus expanded their mandates, which in turn caused a need for an increase both in the number and in the type of peacekeepers (police officers and civilian experts in addition to military personnel). Türkiye also began to contribute more military personnel and some civilian experts to follow the suit of PKO transformation. As the PKOs transformed even more and entered the third generation, their mandates varied even more to include more responsibilities than ever, and this increased number of duties and aims required a variation in the corpus of the

Appendix:

Türkiye's Contributions to PKOs per Mission (UNDPO, 2024h) (continued).

	UNMISS				UNOTIL				UNIFIL				UNIOSIL				UNMIT				BINUB				UNAMID				MINURCAT										
	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.		T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.
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2022			35																																			2022	
2023			18																																			2023	

	MONUSCO				UNAMA				MINUSMA				MINUSCA				UNSONM				MINUJUSTH				UNMEHA				UNITAMS									
	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.	T.	S.O.	E.	M.O.	P.		T.	S.O.	E.		
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Note.

The numbers in November of each year are taken into consideration.

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